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THE TAXPAYER'S EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AS A BAR
TO PRODUCTION OF RECORDS HELD BY HIS ATTORNEY
Upon receipt of an administrative summons for tax-related re-
cords,' a taxpayer or his professional representative, such as an
attorney or accountant, may attempt to block production of records
in the hands of a representative by asserting the taxpayer's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 2 Present case law
indicates that the success of this defense depends upon which repre-
sentative possesses the records and upon the means by which that
representative acquired possession. In Couch v. United States3 the
United States Supreme Court ruled in 1973 that records in the
possession of a taxpayer's accountant were not protected since the
fifth amendment prohibition against compelling an accused to tes-
tify against himself could not be invoked when the accused neither
possessed, nor maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in,
the controverted records. 4
Application of the Couch decision in three-party situations, in-
volving taxpayer, accountant, and attorney, has proved more diffi-
1. Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to
issue an administrative summons for a taxpayer's records:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, .. determin-
ing the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . or collecting
any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be rele-
vant'or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or
care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person
liable for tax. . . , or any other person. . . to appear. . . and to produce such
books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath,
as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 7602. The summons may be enforced by the federal district courts.
Id. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a).
2. "No person shall. . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
. . " U.S. CONST. amend. V. The privilege "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
444-45 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
3. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
4. Id. at 329-36. The Court emphasized that the privilege only forbids compelled testimony
by an accused and that no unconstitutional compulsion was present where the accused
taxpayer lacked any possession. Id. at 328-29.
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cult. In United States v. White5 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit refused, shortly after the Supreme Court's Couch opinion,
to allow a taxpayer's attorney to assert his client's fifth amendment
rights in order to bar production of records when the attorney had
obtained the records directly from the accountant without the tax-
payer's knowledge. Although the attorney intended to use these
records to prepare the taxpayer's defense to a government inquiry,
the court, applying Couch, relied upon the absence of any prior
actual possession by the taxpayer to preclude any imputation of the
attorney's possession to the taxpayer.' Thus never having had any
possession of the records, the taxpayer was deemed to have no fifth
amendment interest in their protection that could be asserted on his
behalf by his attorney.
During the following year, that same court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit considered cases in which a taxpayer,
prior to the service of a summons, personally removed records from
his accountant's possession, delivering them to an attorney who
subsequently attempted to raise the taxpayer's fifth amendment
right as a bar to producing the records. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit ruled in United States v. Fisher7 that no such right
attached, while the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Kasmir5 held that the fifth amendment defense was avail-
able because the attorney's possession, subsequent to actual posses-
sion by the taxpayer, evidenced an expectation of privacy sufficient
to give the taxpayer constructive possession of the documents.9 Al-
though agreeing that a taxpayer's expectation of privacy may be
relevant to the invocation of the fifth amendment defense, the
5. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 487 F.2d 1335, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
132 (1974).
6. Id. at 763.
7. 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 824 (1975) (No. 74-18).
8. 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 824 (1975) (No. 74-611). See Note,
United States v. Kasmir: A Clarification of Fifth Amendment Rights Regarding Documents
Held by an Attorney?, 36 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 728 (1975); 12 HoUSTON L. REv. 504 (1975). The
records summoned in Fisher, 500 F.2d at 685, and White, 477 F.2d at 759, were the accoun-
tant's workpapers, while Kasmir involved accountant's workpapers, the taxpayer's tax re-
turns, and correspondence between the taxpayer and his accountant, 499 F.2d at 446 n.l. The
questioned documents in Couch were the taxpayer's bank statements, payroll records, and
income and expense accounts. 409 U.S. at 324. These slight factual differences have no legal
significance because authorship or ownership should not alone be determinative. See notes
72-82 infra & accompanying text.
9. 499 F.2d at 450-52.
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Fisher and the Kasmir opinions both clouded the application of
Couch unduly."0 Review of the Couch decision, paying close atten-
tion to the specific issues addressed by the opinion, indicates that
the three-party decisions have erred by failing to perceive that ex-
pectations of privacy can exist without any physical possession by
the taxpayer and that the appropriate time for gauging the tax-
payer's expectations is at the moment the summons is served.
THE PRE-Couch Cases
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Couch, lower courts
considering whether taxpayers' attorneys could raise their clients'
fifth amendment privileges as a bar to administrative summonses"
had developed two clearly opposing viewpoints. One line of deci-
sion'2 denied use of the privilege in reliance upon Supreme Court
10. Although it may be possible to distinguish Kasmir and Fisher on their facts because
the taxpayer in the former case may have delivered his records to his attorney for reasons of
security as well as legal advice, Ord, The IRS's Right of Access to CPA's Workpapers and
Client Records, 4 TAx ADVISER 516, 524 (1973), the possibility of a custodial safekeeping
arrangement, see notes 44-46 infra & accompanying text, was not considered expressly in
Kasmir. For a discussion of ethical considerations as another possibly distinguishing factor,
see notes 53-56 infra & accompanying text.
The tax records involved in these cases also are assumed to be "testimonial or communica-
tive" in nature since the fifth amendment protection may not be applicable otherwise.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763.64 (1966). Moreover, it must be assumed that the
summons was not issued solely for purposes of a criminal investigation. See Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). The defendant in Fisher argued that because only the
Internal Revenue Service Intelligence Division, which investigates criminal violations, was
assigned to his case, the summons was issued solely for the improper purpose of obtaining
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. 500 F.2d at 686-87. The court dismissed this
contention, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Donaldson that a section 7602 summons
can be issued by the Intelligence Division, 400 U.S. at 533-36, and that the section 7602
summons unquestionably could be used during civil investigations which also might result
in criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 326 (1973); Donald-
son v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1971). Donaldson only bars a summons issued
solely for the purpose of criminal prosecution; other summonses are sanctioned if issued "in
good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution." 400 U.S. at 536. One
member of the court in United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 765 (5th Cir. 1973) (Ainsworth,
J., dissenting), argued that this good.faith requirement should be construed strictly against
the Government. For a general discussion of compelled production of documents in tax cases,
see Tax Symposium, 2 HOmTRA L. Rv. 129 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
11. The pre-existing document rule precludes the use of the attorney-client privilege as a
defense. See note 77 infra.
12. Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 458 (8th Cir. 1963); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383,
385 (6th Cir. 1961); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 864 (1953); In re Brumbaugh, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9521, at 85,183 (S.D. Cal. 1962);
United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D.N.J. 1959); United States v. Willis, 145
F. Supp. 365, 367-69 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
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holdings that, in particular situations, the privilege could not be
asserted by a representative; 3 other cases" sanctioned this usage,
often as a matter of policy.
In United States v. Boccuto,15 for example, the taxpayer ordered
his accountant to deliver certain records, including the accountant's
workpapers, to the taxpayer's attorney. Served with an administra-
tive summons while in possession of these records, the attorney
attempted to assert his client's fifth amendment defense. Relying
upon three decisions holding the privilege to be solely personal to
the witness, Rogers v. United States," United States v. Willis,1 7 and
Application of Daniels,8 the court reasoned that because the attor-
ney's possession was representative rather than personal or private,
the attorney had no standing to assert the defense. Review of the
cases cited for support in Boccuto, however, reveals the fragile foun-
dation upon which the decision stands.
The defendant in Rogers was a Communist Party member who
waived her fifth amendment rights by voluntarily giving self-
incriminating testimony, but refused to testify further to incrimi-
nate another party member. Ruling that one cannot assert the privi-
lege to protect an unrelated third party, the Supreme Court af-
firmed her conviction for contempt of court." The use of the Su-
preme Court's Rogers decision by the Boccuto court is unpersuasive
because the Supreme Court decision did not address the relation-
ship that would exist when an attorney asserted his client's fifth
amendment privilege.
Moreover, the Willis and Daniels decisions cited in the Boccuto
opinion were predicated upon a series of Supreme Court holdings
that the privilege is personal and not to be asserted by a representa-
13. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694 (1944); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 377-79 (1911); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90,91 (1906); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 69-70 (1906).
14. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460,465-68 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v.
Pritchard, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9434, at 83,548 (N.D. Ala. 1970); United States v. Foster,
Lewis, Langley & Onion, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9418, at 95,515 (W.D. Tex. 1965); Application
of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
15. 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1959).
16. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
17. 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
18. 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
19. 340 U.S. at 371.
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tive.20 In each of the cases, however, the Supreme Court used the
word "personal" only to distinguish natural persons from collective
entities.21 These decisions therefore should be read as stating only
that the privilege is unavailable to a collective entity, such as a
corporation, and may not be asserted on its behalf by its representa-
tive.2 2 Despite this narrow holding of the "collective entity" line of
cases and the resulting doubt that should be cast upon Willis and
Daniels, the court in Boccuto deemed the latter two decisions suffi-
ciently persuasive to preclude the attorney from asserting his
client's privilege.m
The opposing view was exemplified by Application of House2 in
which a federal district court confronted a factual situation similar
to that in Boccuto. Because the records sought were the property of
the taxpayer's accountant, the Government argued in House that
the privilege was unavailable to the taxpayer. Citing a statement by
the Supreme Court that "the papers and effects which the privilege
protects must be the private property of the person claiming the
privilege or at least in his possession in a purely personal
20. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74
(1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
21. The Court declared in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906): "[W]e are of the opinion
that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation
. ." This language was cited with approval in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 364
(1911). There is dictum in Hale to the effect that an agent may not assert his principal's
privilege whether the principal is a corporation or an individual. 201 U.S. at 70. This issue
was not presented in Hale nor is it controlling in the other cases in this series. All deal with
the records of collective entities of some sort- active corporations (Hale, Wilson), defunct
corporations (Grant), or labor unions (White). For comment on the use of these "collective
entity" cases in suits to compel attorneys to produce the records of individual clients, see
United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1963); Lay, Attorney's Assertion of His
Client's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Criminal Tax Investigations, 21 U. MIAMI L.
Rav. 854, 855 (1967); Symposium, supra note 10, at 203-05.
22. The "collective entity" interpretation is buttressed by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Bellis v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 2179 (1974), in which the Court stated: "These
decisions [Wilson, Grant, and White] reflect the Court's consistent view that the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination should be 'limited to its historic function of protecting
only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or
personal records."' Id. at 2184, quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
23. In determining that the privilege was unavailable, the Bocutto court also placed great
emphasis upon the fact that the accountant, rather than the taxpayer, owned the contro-
verted documents. 175 F. Supp. at 889-90. This rationale is not convincing in light of the
holding in Couch that possession rather than ownership is decisive. See note 42 infra &
accompanying text.
24. 144 F. Supp. 95 (N. D. Cal. 1956).
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capacity,"25 the court ruled that the defense was available because
rightful and indefinite possession short of ownership was deemed
sufficient for assertion of the privilege. 6
Also addressed by the House opinion was an issue that became
pivotal in the Kasmir-Fisher conflict, namely, whether possession
by an attorney is equivalent to possession by his client. In response
to the Government's assertion that it was not, the court in House,
endorsing a New York state case,2' ruled that an attorney's posses-
sion is the equivalent of the client's possession by finding that the
taxpayer met the requirement of "possession in a purely personal
capacity." Moreover, it reasoned that as a matter of policy an
attorney should be allowed to assert his client's privilege for him;
otherwise, during a protracted series of administrative hearings the
taxpayer's fifth amendment rights could be preserved only by com-
pliance with a "novel" and unduly burdensome requirement of the
taxpayer's physical'presence.2s
House apparently remains sound since it utilized a possession-
oriented analysis in conformity with that espoused by the Supreme
Court in Couch. Conversely, the Boccuto line of cases appears ques-
tionable because, in addition to its dubious use of the "collective
entity" cas3s, Boccuto has been undermined further by the Su-
preme Court's statement in United States v. Donaldson0 that a
party may intervene in a suit where records are sought in which he
25. Id. at 101, quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) (emphasis supplied
by the House court).
26. 144 F. Supp. at 101. This reasoning was particularly cogent in light of the later state-
ment in Couch that possession rather than ownership determines the availability of the
defense. See note 42 infra & accompanying text. See also notes 64, 65 infra & accompany-
ing text.
27. People v. Minkowitz, 220 N.Y. 399, 115 N.E. 987 (1917). In Minkowitz the Court of
Appeals held that when a defendant rightfully in possession of documents transferred them
to his attorney, the attorney's possession could be equated with that of his client.
In House, the Government cited three cases to support its argument that an attorney's
possession may not be equated with that of his client: Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d
277 (9th Cir. 1953); Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D. Cal. 1952). The court distinguished the latter two on the
ground that they were cases in which the privilege had become unavailable through waiver.
144 F. Supp. at 99-100. Remmer was considered irrelevant because the party claiming the
privilege had acquired the summoned records from the Government by promising to return
them. See id. at 100.
28. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). The interpretation of White found in
House is reasonable even when compared to the argument advanced in Beccuto that the
privilege cannot be asserted by a representative. See notes 15-23 supra & accompanying text.
29. 144 F. Supp. at 100.
30. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
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has "a significantly protectable interest."31 In Boccuto the district
court had ruled that an attorney had no standing to assert his
client's privilege .12 Inasmuch as the controverted records in Boccuto
were the taxpayer's own records, the Donaldson holding would allow
the taxpayer to intervene in an enforcement proceeding directed
against his attorney.3 Thus the standing hurdle interposed by
Boccuto no longer presents any practical problem since the tax--
payer's rights can be protected by his intervention into the proceed-
ing. The issue now determinative is one not directly addressed by
the Boccuto opinion: Does the taxpayer retain his fifth amendment
privilege even though his records are in his attorney's possession?
This question was answered affirmatively in the House decision and
was paralleled by the question presented to the Supreme Court in
Couch.
31. Id. at 531. Unable to find such an interest present, the Court in Donaldson refused
intervention by an employee subject to a tax investigation in a proceeding to compel produc-
tion of his employer's records after discerning that the employee did not own the records and
could not claim that they were the work product of his attorney or accountant. Id. at 530. To
a certain degree, Donaldson limits United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), and Reisman
v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), which had been utilized by lower courts to justify intervention
on a broad scale. See, eg., United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192,1194 (7th Cir. 1969) (party
whose tax liability at issue allowed to intervene with facts similar to Donaldson); United
States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 932-33 (3d Cir. 1969) (depositor-taxpayer allowed
to intervene on fourth amendment ground in a proceeding to require bank to produce records
of depositor's transactions). For an analysis of Donaldson's effect on intervention, see Com-
ment, Is the Odd Man Out: The Taxpayer's Right to Intervene in Judicial Enforcement of a
Summons Directed Against a Third Party-Donaldson v. United States, 1971 UTAH L. RaV.
561.
32. 175 F. Supp. at 890.
33. 40 BRooKr.' L. REv. 211, 217-18 n.40 (1973). See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
336-37 (1973); 42 FoRDnwA L. REv. 197,203-04 (1973); 5 ST. MARy's L. REv. 337, 339-40 (1973).
Intervention also will be allowed when records are the work product of the taxpayer's
accountant or attorney. See note 31 supra. In its petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari
in Kasmir, see note 8 supra, the Government argued that an attorney should not be allowed
to invoke his client's privilege when the client could have intervened and claimed the privilege
himself, as is the case in Kasmir. It was the Government's position that intervention should
be required as the trial court may find it necessary to examine the taxpayer. Petitioner's Brief
for Certiorari at 11, United States v. Kasmir (U.S., filed Nov. 18, 1974). It would seem,
however, that if the trial court wished to examine the taxpayer it could simply exercise its
subpoena power and require his attendance. A similar argument was made by the taxpayer
in Kasmir. See Respondent's Brief Opposing Certiorari at 19, United States v. Kasmir, No.
74-611 (U.S., filed Jan. 6, 1975) (Government also has subpoena power).
In Kasmir the court did not rely upon Donaldson to find that the taxpayer's attorney had
standing, but rather ruled that as a matter of policy an attorney and his client should be
regarded as one, 499 F.2d at 454; in Fisher the finding that the privilege was unavailable to
the taxpayer apparently made consideration of the attorney's standing to assert the tax-
payer's privilege unnecessary.
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THE Couch DECISION
In Couch v. United States4 the question presented was whether
a taxpayer could assert the fifth amendment to prevent production
of personal records in her accountant's possession. Taxpayer
Couch's income tax returns had been prepared by the same
accountant for approximately fifteen years prior to the Govern-
ment's attempt to require production of her tax records. The ac-
countant retained these records at his office although it was under-
stood that they were the taxpayer's property. After a summons was
served upon the accountant, taxpayer Couch was allowed to inter-
vene in the subsequent enforcement proceeding. The Supreme
Court's analysis focused upon the taxpayer's ability to assert her
fifth amendment privilege on the basis of her ownership of the docu-
ments despite her lack of actual possession.
Prefacing its discussion with a consideration of the various poli-
cies underlying the fifth amendment privilege,3 the Court attached
particular significance to Justice Holmes' earlier statement that "a
party is privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its
production,"," and concluded that only compelled testimony by an
accused was prohibited by the fifth amendment. Information pro-
vided by a third party, although incriminating the accused, was not
regarded as privileged.3 The taxpayer argued to no avail that an
early Supreme Court case, Boyd v. United States," established that
an owner of papers is protected from their compelled production.
The Court distinguished Boyd on the ground that the defendant in
that case had both owned and possessed the controverted papers.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that courts following
the Boyd rule25 usually have been faced with circumstances in which
possession and ownership were "conjoined." 4 After noting with ap-
34. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
35. Among the policies considered were the need to avoid forcing defendants to choose
between self-incrimination and perjury, the need to avoid coerced confessions, the protection
of individual privacy, and the desirability of requiring the Government to "shoulder the entire
load" in developing its evidence. 409 U.S. at 328. For a discussion of the applicability of the
right to privacy to the privilege against self-incrimination, see note 48 infra.
36. 409 U.S. at 328, quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
37. 409 U.S. at 328.
38. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
39. See Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); United
States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
40. 409 U.S. at 330.
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proval the circuit court opinion in Cohen v. United States,4' Justice
Powell, stated that possession, not ownership, "bears the closest
relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the fifth
amendment.1 2 Although possession was deemed determinative in
Couch, the Court refused to establish a per se rule that the fifth
amendment may be asserted only by those in possession of sum-
moned documents, instead carefully limiting its holding to the facts
presented.43
One situation excepted from the Couch rule was that of "con-
structive possession." The Court adduced two cases, Schwimmer v.
United States" and United States v. Guterma,5 as examples of
constructive possession that could support assertion of fifth amend-
ment protection. In each of these cases a taxpayer who had stored
personal records on the premises of a corporation was permitted to
assert his fifth amendment privilege to protect the records from a
grand jury subpoena directed to the corporation.46 Indicating that a
determination of the limits of constructive possession was not neces-
sary for its decision,4 7 the Court declined to specify the different
41. 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967). Justice Powell made the following reference to Cohen:
See also United States v. Cohen ... where the court, in upholding the right of
a possesser, nonowner, to assert the privilege, noted that "it is possession of
papers sought by the government, not ownership, which sets the stage for exer-
cise of the governmental compulsion which it is the purpose of the privilege to
prohibit." Though the instant case concerns the scope of the privilege for an
owner, nonpossessor, the Ninth Circuit's linkage of possession to the purposes
served by the privilege was appropriate.
We do not, of course, decide what qualifies as rightful possession enabling the
possessor to assert the privilege.
409 U.S. at 330 n.12. Justice Powell's qualifying statement regarding "rightful possession"
has prompted some commentators to suggest that the Cohen citation may not indicate a
general approval of that court's decision. See, e.g., Ord, The IRS's Right of Access to the
CPA's Workpapers and Client Records, 4 TAx ADvisEn 516, 523 (1973). An examination of
Cohen indicates that this disagreement is limited to the dictum in Cohen that possession of
papers allows the assertion of the privilege even when the owner-accountant has requested
their return.
42. 409 U.S. at 331.
43. Id. at 336 n.20.
44. 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
45. 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959).
46. 409 U.S. at 333 n.16. The Government attempted to distinguish those cases as "involv-
ing mere custodial safekeeping." Id.
47. Id. The Court ruled that the accountant's status as an independent contractor and the
fact that the records had been accumulating in his possession for approximately fifteen years
eliminated any possibility of constructive possession on the part of the taxpayer. Id. at 619.
A different situation could be presented if the records were held by an attorney, rather than
an accountant, and they were held for a shorter period of time.
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types of constructive possession that might satisfy the possession-
oriented analysis reflected in the opinion.
The Court also addressed the taxpayer's expectations of privacy. 8
When preparing taxpayer Couch's income tax returns, the
accountant had been required to disclose to the IRS much of the
data contained in the summoned records. Finding that a taxpayer's
transfer of these documents to an accountant under such circum-
stances negates any expectation of confidentiality, 49 Justice Powell
concluded that the fifth amendment defense must fail where there
Ccexists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of
governmental compulsion against the accused."55 The Court there-
fore ruled that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
48. It is not clear whether this privacy discussion represents an independent ground for the
Couch decision or merely elaborates the preceding discussion of "constructive possession."
It is difficult to imagine situations in which one in "constructive possession" of documents
would not also have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Certainly the examples of "construc-
tive possession" cited in Couch also would involve an expectation of privacy. That "construc-
tive possession" may be equated with the expectation of privacy is implied by the Court's
apparent ruling that the presence of either allows assertion of the fifth amendment privilege.
See note 50 infra & accompanying text, The equivalence of "constructive possession" and the
expectation of privacy is suggested in a somewhat different fashion in Symposium, supra note
10, at 183, wherein it is said that "the real governmental compulsion on the individual in
constructive possession of the evidence sought is the forced disclosure of information which
the individual legitimately expected to remain private."
Although a privacy analysis is commonly associated with the fourth amendment prohibi-
tion of "unreasonable searches and seizures," it also has been used often in discussions of fifth
amendment rights. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (1974); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The Supreme Court in Couch, quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm. of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), stated that the fifth amend-
ment respects "the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life. .. ." 409 U.S. at 328. The opinions subsequently rendered in United States v. Fisher,
500 F.2d 683, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1974), and United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 449 (5th Cir.
1974), agreed that Couch requires consideration of the taxpayer's expectation of privacy.
Even though the majority opinion in Couch stated that the fifth amendment privilege encom-
passes the right to privacy, one court of appeals judge in Fisher opined that the Couch
examination of a taxpayer's expectation of privacy was made in a fourth amendment context.
500 F.2d at 701 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Hunter agreed, however, that a taxpayer's
expectation of privacy must be examined to determine if the taxpayer has retained "construc-
tive possession." Id.
49. 409 U.S. at 335. But see Comment, The Protection of Privacy by the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: A Doctrine Laid to Rest?, 59 IowA L. REv. 1336 (1974).
50. 409 U.S. at 336 (emphasis supplied). The Court's use of the word "and" apparently
indicates that the presence of either of these elements is sufficient to allow the assertion of
the fifth amendment defense. Justice Powell's words imply that in order to compel produc-
tion, the Government must show that the taxpayer has neither a reasonable expectation of
privacy nor actual possession since actual possession "bears the closest relationship to the
personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 331.
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incrimination could not be raised by a taxpayer to prevent produc-
tion of tax records held by an accountant. The Court's refusal to
consider situations beyond the bare facts before it, coupled with its
reluctance to define sharply "constructive possession," left unde-
fined the rights of a taxpayer when an administrative summons is
served upon his attorney for production of the taxpayer's records in
the possession of the attorney.
ATMPTs To APPLY Couch
Both the Kasmir 1 and Fisher2 courts emphasized the individual's
expectations of privacy when considering the taxpayer's rights, but
strayed in their attempts to determine those expectations. Each
court faced a fact pattern in which a taxpayer acquired documents
from his accountant, held them briefly, then delivered them to his
attorney who had actual possession when the summons arrived. In
each case the questioned records included the accountant's work
papers. Legal comparisons of these decisions, however, are difficult,
in part because analysis of the Fisher opinion is complicated by that
court's failure to state explicitly the grounds upon which its decision
rests and by its vague allusions to several matters which could have
influenced the decision.
For instance, it is possible that the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit decided Fisher on .the basis of an issue not presented in
Kasmir, the issue of rightful possession. At the hearing the tax-
payer's accountant testified that he had requested the return of his
workpapers from the attorney. 3 After noting both this fact and the
failure of the Couch opinion to determine the elements of rightful
possession,54 the court, though not finding specifically that the tax-
payer's possession was wrongful, rendered a cryptic holding that
could reflect such a determination:
Thus, if the taxpayers are to succeed in their effort, they must
prove that their brief experience of actual possession for a lim-
51. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct.
824 (1975) (No. 74-611).
52. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683, 689 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 824
(1975) (No. 74-18).
53. 500 F.2d at 685. For discussion of the notion that such conduct by an accountant
implies an unethical attempt to curry the favor of the Internal Revenue Service, see
Symposium, supra note 10, at 255 n.573.
54. 500 F.2d at 689.
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ited purpose coupled with turning their, accountant's records
over to their attorney has the legal capacity to generate a subse-
quent right of constructive possession of sufficient intensity to
elevate those records into the required category of their "private
books and papers." We are unwilling to attribute a Fifth
Amendment protection to the accountant's work product based
on such a limited possession by his clientV5
The court's reference to "possession of sufficient intensity" may
indicate a determination that possession against the owner's will is
not adequate for assertion of the fifth amendment privilege."6 While
the "sufficient intensity" language most likely refers to some con-
cept other than this type of rightful possession, the possibility can-
not be discounted due to the imprecise nature of the Fisher opin-
ion. 7
A review of United States v. Egenberg,5 a case deemed persuasive
by the Fisher court, 9 may indicate more precisely the intended
meaning of the "sufficient intensity" language. The Egenberg court
55. Id. at 692. Evidence exists, however, that the taxpayer had possession with his
accountant's permission. See id. at 685 n.2.
56. A determination that a taxpayer's possession was wrongful, based upon facts similar
to those in Fisher, has proved decisive in cases decided both before and after Couch. See,
e.g., Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Riland, 364 F.
Supp. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court in United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464,469 (9th
Cir. 1967), suggested, however, that wrongful possession might he sufficient to allow assertion
of the fifth amendment privilege. While Couch cited Cohen favorably, the Supreme Court
expressly limited its approval to the Cohen statement that possession, not ownership, deter-
mines the availability of the fifth amendment privilege, refusing to endorse dictum in Cohen
to the effect that even possession against the owner's will was sufficient for assertion of the
fifth amendment privilege. See note 41 supra. The problem of possession against the owner's
will is not presented by Kasmir, 499 F.2d at 446, but the Government nonetheless argued that
the taxpayer's acquisition of possession was wrongful because it was motivated by a desire
to avoid compelled production. Two independent definitions of "rightful possession" thus can
be formulated: The one to which Couch and Fisher alluded is possession with the owner's
permission; the definition urged by the Government in Kasmir is possession not acquired to
avoid compelled production. Since the Couch opinion seemingly refers only to the former type
of rightful possession, it provides no support for the Government's position in Kasmir. See
notes 125-134 infra & accompanying text.
57. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hunter stated that he was unable to discern the
rationale upon which the majority premised its decision. 500 F.2d at 699. Judge Hunter also
referred to the majority's "possession of sufficient intensity" language as being "vague and
obscure." Id. at 700.
58. 443 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1971).
59. 500 F.2d at 691. The district court in Fisher, which rendered its decision prior to the
Supreme Court's Couch ruling, also emphasized Egenberg. See note 61 infra & accompanying
text.
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held that when a third party has a superior possessory interest in
the controverted records, the taxpayer may not assert the fifth
amendment as a bar to production."' Adhering to Egenberg, the trial
court in Fisher ruled that the taxpayer was precluded from raising
the fifth amendment when the accountant, rather than the tax-
payer, owned the records."1 Thus the requirement of "constructive
possession of sufficient intensity" by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit could refer to ownership or a superior right to posses-
sion.
Such a ruling, however, hardly remains viable after the ruling in
Couch that possession rather than ownership is the most significant
factor in determining the availability of the fifth amendment de-
fense. This contradiction is illustrated by the statement in Egenberg
that Cohen was "unpersuasive. "62 Cohen permitted a taxpayer to
raise the defense while in possession of documents owned by an-
other.13 Although the Government urged the application of the
superior possessory interest test, the Cohen court indicated a belief
that such a rule would be the equivalent of requiring ownership and
instead required only possession for assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege.6 While not rejecting specifically the superior
possessory interest test, the Supreme Court in Couch cited with
approval the Cohen conclusion that ownership is not required.65 The
statement in Fisher that "Couch does not undercut Egenberg,"66
indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of Couch and suggests
that the court's determination that the taxpayer's possession was
not of "sufficient intensity" may really be a finding of a superior
possessory interest in the taxpayer's accountant. Such a finding also
may explain the reference in Fisher to the. taxpayer's "limited pos-
session."67 In view of the Supreme Court's holding in Couch, such a
finding should not be determinative. To the 'extent that Fisher is
premised upon Egenberg, it is not convincing.
60. The court stated: "Where, as here, a third party has a superior right to possession of
the papers, the witness cannot withhold them." 443 F.2d at 517.
61. 352 F. Supp. at 734-35.
62. 443 F.2d at 518.
63. 388 F.2d at 467.
64. Id. at 468.
65. The Cohen language quoted by the Couch court was part of the Cohen rationale for
rejecting the superior possessory interest test. United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th
Cir. 1967). See note 41 supra & accompanying text.
66. 500 F.2d at 691.
67. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
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A further possible misinterpretation of Couch is indicated by a
reference in Fisher to the taxpayer's "brief experience of actual
possession" as a sign that the taxpayer did not have possession of
"sufficient intensity."6 In Couch the Supreme Court discussed the
duration of the accountant's possession69 and described circumstan-
ces in which a taxpayer's loss of possession might be so "temporary
and insignificant" that he clearly would retain control of the docu-
ments." The latter expression in Couch merely illustrated the
Court's belief that a brief loss of possession might be insignificant.71
At no time did the Court attach significance to the length of time
that the records were in the taxpayer's possession, and nowhere did
it suggest that any particular duration of possession was required in
order to allow assertion of the fifth amendment privilege.
Another ambiguity in Fisher concerns the court's apparent reli-
ance upon Boyd for the statement that the taxpayer must prove
possession adequate to make the records his "private books and
papers" in order to assert the fifth amendment. 2 The court
apparently contended that, although the records related to the tax-
payer's taxes, the fact that they were prepared and owned by the
accountant precluded a finding that they were the taxpayer's
private papers. In a cogent dissent, Judge Hunter noted that the
Supreme Court in Boyd had refused to compel production of docu-
ments prepared by a third party.7 3 Moreover, the Court stated long
ago in Wilson v. United States74 that authorship of documents is not
significant to assertions of fifth amendment privileges.
Viewed from another perspective, however, the statement in
Fisher that the records were not "private papers" may evidence an
underlying attempt to discover whether the taxpayer had a reason-
able expectation of privacy. After noting the relevance of the tax-
68. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
69. 409 U.S. at 324.
70. Id. at 333.
71. Id.
72. 500 F.2d at 692, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). See note 38
supra & accompanying text.
73. 500 F.2d at 700. Alternatively, the Fisher reliance upon the word "private" could
represent a misapplication of the "collective entity" line of cases. These cases contrasted the
individual's private, personal papers with those held by the individual as the representative
of a collective entity. See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). See notes
20-23 supra & accompanying text. Since the Fisher records relate to the taxpayer's own taxes,
the "collective entity" cases are inapplicable.
74. 221 U.S. 361, 378 (1911) (dictum).
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payer's expectation, 5 the court observed that the accountant's pap-
ers were prepared to enable him to complete the defendant's tax
returns rather than for confidential use by the defendant's attor-
ney. 6 The court's comment in Fisher concerning the accountant's
preparation and ownership of the documents implied a belief that
a taxpayer's expectation of privacy could not be changed by his
acquisition of the documents because the nature of the documents
remained unaltered." Judge Gibbons made a similar statement in
his concurring opinion in cautioning that the majority opinion
should not be interpreted as ruling that the privilege would be avail-
able if the papers were in the taxpayer's possession."8 This is a
somewhat startling caveat for if the taxpayer were in possession, the
75. 500 F.2d at 689.
76. Id. at 692.
77. The court had stated previously that in order to prevail a taxpayer must demonstrate
that he could have asserted the fifth amendment privilege while in actual possession of the
records. 500 F.2d at 689. The discussion of the accountant's preparation of the records seems
designed to expose the taxpayer's inability to assert the privilege.
The accountant's preparation of the records may be relevant to the availability of an
attorney-client privilege because of the "pre-existing document" rule of evidence. This rule
states that documents prepared prior to the creation of the attorney-client relationship are
not protected by that relationship. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683, 697 n.11
(3d Cir. 1974); United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 762 n.9 (5th Cir. 1973); Bouschor v.
United States, 316 F.2d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1963); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 97
(N.D. Cal. 1956); 8 J. WiGMORE, EVmENCE § 2307, at 594 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
The attorney-client privilege relates to the outcome of the case only if the significant
assumption is made that the taxpayer's expectation of privacy could not change when the
documents were acquired from his accountant. Assuming that the expectation of privacy
could not change, the only possible protection for the records would rest in the use of the
attorney-client privilege, a privilege not attaching to the records in cases such as Fisher or
Kasmir because of the "pre-existing document" rule. Thus, if the taxpayer's expectation of
privacy could not change, the absence of an attorney-client privilege would be decisive, and
fifth amendment protections could never attach to taxpayers' documents prepared by ac-
countants.
For a novel-approach to the relationship of the attorney-client and fifth amendment privi-
leges, see Petersen, Attorney Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54
MmN. L. REv. 67, 85-86 (1969), in which the author contended that the attorney-client
privilege should be extended to include all documents in the attorney's possession that would
be privileged in the client's hands. This approach was cited with approval in United States
v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 345 (M.D. Pa. 1973). Other authorities believe that the
attorney-client privilege should not be expanded. See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d
Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).
78. 500 F.2d at 693. Judge Gibbons cited Wilson v. United States, 221U.S. 361 (1911), and
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), to support his statement that even if the
taxpayer were in actual possession of the records he would be unable to assert the privilege.
However, these cases merely state that the fifth amendment defense may not be asserted in
regard to the records of collective entities. See notes 20-23 supra & accompanying text.
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situation would duplicate the facts of Cohen: a taxpayer in actual
possession of workpapers prepared and owned by the taxpayer's
accountant. The Cohen rationale, which allowed a taxpayer to as-
sert his fifth amendment privilege because possession was deemed
more significant than ownership, was approved by the Supreme
Court in Couch." Thus the mere preparation and ownership of tax
records by an accountant should not preclude a taxpayer's subse-
quent assertion of his fifth amendment privilege.
More fundamentally, the relevant time for determining the avail-
ability of the fifth amendment defense is the moment that the sum-
mons is served, not the time period during which the accountant
prepared the documents. As the Supreme Court stated in Couch:
"The rights and obligations of the parties became fixed when the
summons was served. . . ."I' The critical issue therefore becomes
whether the taxpayer had possession of the documents or a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy at the time the summons was served, not
79. See note 41 supra & accompanying text. By implying that the taxpayer in Couch would
have been able to assert the fifth amendment defense despite the fact that the accountant
had prepared the documents, see note 65 supra & accompanying text, the Supreme Court
would appear to have rejected the imputation of an unalterable status to such documents.
The proposition that a taxpayer in rightful possession of documents cannot be compelled to
produce them has been accepted gefierally. See United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683, 695-96
(3d Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 1974);
Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Zakutansky, 401
F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 198), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); United States v. Cohen, 388
F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Kleckner, 273 F. Supp. 251, 252 (S.D. Ohio 1967); United States v. Foster, Lewis,
Langley, & Onion. 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9418 (W.D. Tex. 1965); Stafford & Jackson, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Tax Investigations, 34 LA. L. REv. 703, 715-
16, 725 (1974); Note, Fifth Amendment Rights of a Client Regarding Documents Held by His
Attorney: United States v. White, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1080, 1091-92; 5 ST. MARw's L.J. 337, 342
(1973). See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 n.12 (1973); Application of House,
144 F. Supp. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1956); note 80 infra & accompanying text. Indeed the
Government implicitly conceded this point in Couch by stating that it normally allowed
taxpayers in possession to plead the fifth amendment privilege. See 409 U.S. at 334 n.18.
Nevertheless, the Government contended in Fisher that the taxpayer could not have asserted
the privilege if the documents had been in his actual possession. 500 F.2d at 689.
80. 409 U.S. at 329 n.9. The Court's remarks were designed to show that Couch's
accountant could not have enlarged the taxpayer's rights by use of a post-summons transfer
of the documents to the taxpayer. The Court's statement that the rights "of the parties
became fixed when the summons was served," coupled with its approval of Cohen, suggests
that a pre-summons transfer would allow the taxpayer to assert his fifth amendment privi-
lege. See also Note, Fifth Amendment Rights of a Client Regarding Documents Held by His
Attorney: United States v. White, 1973 DU=n L.J. 1080, 1096 n.89 (transfer before issuance
should be allowed on basis of logic; Couch not considered).
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whether the taxpayer or someone else created the documents. The
Couch decision emphasized that the accountant, in preparing his
client's tax returns, had been required to reveal much of the infor-
mation contained in his workpapers. 8 In light of this fact, the inevi-
table conclusion is reached that the taxpayer in Couch could have
had no reasonable expectation of privacy because the papers were
in the accountant's possession at the time the summons was
served."2 Although in Fisher the court considered the general ques-
tion of the taxpayer's expectation of privacy, its analysis was
clouded by the emphasis placed upon the accountant's ownership
and preparation of the papers prior to the time the summons was
served.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has developed a test
for application of the fifth amendment privilege in three-party situ-
ations which heavily emphasizes possession of tax records by the
taxpayer in the course of determining the taxpayer's expectation of
privacy. In United States v. Whitel8 the taxpayer, realizing that a
tax investigation was in progress, retained counsel who contacted
the taxpayer's accountant and obtained possession of all relevant
documents. The taxpayer never had actual possession of the re-
cords, nor was he aware of the transfer until after its occurrence.
When a summons was served on the attorney, he attempted to plead
the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege. Reading the "construc-
tive possession" exception 'n Couch"' as indicating that the docu-
ments might have been privileged if the taxpayer personally had
transferred the papers to his attorney while retaining the right to
immediate possession,85 the court found the attorney's defense to be
precluded by the absence of even brief actual possession by the
taxpayer and by the lack of any right to immediate possession in the
taxpayer.88 The court also noted that the taxpayer was unaware of
81. 409 U.S. at 335.
82. Conversely, if taxpayer Couch had been in possession of the documents at the time the
summons was served, her reasonable expectations would have differed. The fact that the
accountant's prior preparation of tax returns required disclosure of some information con-
tained in the records would have been irrelevant. As a corollary, if the taxpayer in Couch had
delivered the accountant's workpapers to her attorney before the summons was served, the
issue then raised would have been her expectation of privacy while the attorney maintained
them in his possession, irrespective of the accountant's preparation of the papers.
83. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973).
84. See notes 44-47 supra & accompanying text.
85. 477 F.2d at 763.
86. Id.
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his attorney's possession, although this factor was not deemed to
be of "controlling importance."81
This requirement of either an instant of actual possession or a
right to immediate possession, however, is an unsound interpreta-
tion of Couch. Taxpayer Couch apparently had a right to immediate
possession since she owned the documents in her accountant's pos-
session and he later delivered them to her upon request.M Neverthe-
less the Supreme Court found her ownership interest constitution-
ally insignificant. Nor did the requirement of an instant of actual
possession arise from Couch since the taxpayer would have met this
requirement because she had actual possession before the docu-
ments were given to her accountant.89 What taxpayer Couch did not
have at the time the summons was served was actual possession or
a reasonable expectation of privacy. As Justice Powell observed,
her records were in the hands of a third party who was required by
law to disclose much of their content during the preparation of her
tax returns." The taxpayer in White did not have actual possession,
and at the time the summons was served he was not aware that his
attorney controlled the documents. Therefore, a more appropriate
application of Couch in White would result in a finding that, since
to the best of the taxpayer's knowledge, the records were still in his
accountant's possession, his expectations of privacy were the same
as those of taxpayer Couch. Although a proper conclusion was
reached in White, the absence of even an instant of actual posses-
sion by the taxpayer should not dictate the outcome of a situation
such as that presented in White; rather, the determinant should be
recognized as the taxpayer's ignorance of his attorney's possession
as indicated by the fact that the taxpayer did not transfer the re-
cords to his attorney. Although the expectation of privacy analysis
was not articulated fully in White, the decision nonetheless focuses
attention upon the lack of knowledge of the taxpayer and the con-
comitant absence of an expectation of privacy.
87. Id.
88. 409 U.S. at 324-25.
89. Id. at 324.
90. Id. at 335.
91. A privacy analysis also can be used to explain the examples given in Couch of "con-
structive possession." All of the examples involved taxpayers who stored their records on the
premises of a corporation. See notes 44-47 supra & accompanying text. From the taxpayers'
viewpoint it was not their immediate right to possession that was significant, but their
expectation of privacy.
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In United States v. Kasmir92 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit again addressed a three-party situation. In Kasmir, how-
ever, the tax records were transferred physically by the taxpayer
from the accountant to the attorney before the summons arrived.
Reasoning that the taxpayer could have asserted the fifth amend-
ment to block production when the documents were in his own
hands, the court determined that the issue was whether the tax-
payer had "a sufficient legitimate expectation of privacy in the
summoned records to warrant the label of constuctive posses-
sion."93 Because the taxpayer sent the records to his attorney pur-
suant to their attorney-client relationship, the court concluded that
the taxpayer "retained a legitimate expectation of privacy with re-
gard to the materials he placed in his attorney's custody, that he
retained constructive possession of the evidence, and thus that he
retained Fifth Amendment protection." 4
Because of their differing results, it is necessary to attempt to
reconcile the Kasmir and White decisions. In Kasmir the issue was
whether the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege which existed
while the taxpayer physically possessed the records continued after
the taxpayer transferred the records to his attorney. In White the
issue was whether the privilege was created by the transfer from the
accountant to the attorney when the taxpayer had neither knowl-
edge of the transfer nor any prior physical possession. These issues,
however, should be legally indistinguishable and should be judged
by the same standard. Absent taxpayer possession, that standard
should be "whether the taxpayer has a sufficient legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the summoned records . . ... , MoreoVer, the
expectation should be determined at the time the summons is
served. 6
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit would not agree fully
with this standard because that court would require at least an
instant of physical possession by the taxpayer before permitting the
fifth amendment to be raised as a bar to production." It distin-
92. 499 F.2d 444 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 824 (1975) (No. 74-611).
93. Id. at 452, citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 332, 334-38 (1973).
94. 499 F.2d at 453.
95. Id. at 452, citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 332, 334-38 (1973).
96. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 n.9 (1973); note 80 supra & accompany-
ing text.
97. See 499 F.2d at 452-53. Following Couch the court in Kasmir would not find that the
taxpayer had any fifth amendment rights in the records while they were in the possession of
the accountant. When the records were returned to the taxpayer for him to transfer them to
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guished its differing holdings in Kasmir and White specifically on
the basis that the taxpayer in Kasmir had physical possession of the
records at least for a brief period of time whereas the taxpayer in
White never possessed the controverted documents." The availabil-
ity of the fifth amendment defense, however, should not be deter-
mined by a brief instant of possession by the taxpayer because, as
Judge -Ainsworth stated in his dissent in White: "No policy would
be served by requiring the client first to touch the documents before
turning them over to his lawyer." Once the requirement of a mo-
ment's physical possession is perceived as extraneous, the availabil-
ity of the fifth amendment defense can be determined by a straight-
forward examination of the taxpayer's expectations when the con-
troverted records are in the possession of his attorney.
ATTORNY'S PossEssIoN AND A TAXPAYER'S EXPECrATIONS
Guidance in identifying factors constituting a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy can be found in the Supreme Court's decision in
Couch. One factor stressed by Justice Powell as an indication of
taxpayer Couch's lack of "constructive possession" was the length
of the accountant's possession.110 Because the records had been ac-
cumulating in the accountant's office for approximately fifteen
years, and the taxpayer displayed no interest in the records at the
time the summons was served, the taxpayer should have had no
expectation of privacy regarding the records. 10' In contrast, the at-
torney in Kasmir obtained possession one day before being served,102
his attorney, the Kasmir court would acknowledge that the period of actual possession by the
taxpayer would be sufficient to create fifth amendment rights that could continue in the
taxpayer when the documents were transferred by him to the attorney. However, for the
taxpayer to obtain rights in the records when they were transferred without the taxpayer's
participation or even knowledge, as in White, the fifth amendment rights would have to be
created in some fashion merely by the fact of the transfer. This distinction was dispositive
for the Kasmir court, which stated: "We reject the notion, as we did in White, that a Fifth
Amendment privilege in the taxpayer can somehow be created when evidence finds its way
into his attorney's hands." Id. at 452.
98. Id. at 453. The court in Kasmirrecognized the possibility that its decision would appear
to stress form over substance, id. at 451, but attempted to avoid such a resultby its interpre-
tation of reasonable expectations of privacy in relation to the facts presented in that case,
id. at 452.
99. 477 F.2d at 766 n.7.
100. 409 U.S. at 324.
101. Id. at 324-25. The rights of the parties are determined at the time the summons is
served. See note 80 supra & accompanying text.
102. 499 F.2d at 446.
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while the attorney in Fisher had prior possession of the documents
for only four months."°3 In each of these latter cases, the taxpayers
had demonstrated a strong concern for the protection of their re-
cords before the summons was issued by transferring the documents
from accountant to attorney.
A further indication of the taxpayer's expectations is the
relationship that exists between the taxpayer and the attorney. Jus-
tice Powell found in Couch that the accountant's status as an inde-
pendent contractor was significant in ruling against the taxpayer.10
It cannot be denied that in Kasmir and Fisher the attorneys also
were independent contractors; nevertheless an attorney's obligation
to his client is materially different from that of an accountant. As
noted in Couch,"' an accountant must divulge much of the informa-
tion contained in his client's records during the preparation of in-
come tax returns. As noted in Kasmir,10 however, an attorney in
possession of his client's records for the purpose of providing legal
advice is not so obligated; indeed, he may be compelled to do the
opposite. Although the attorney-client privilege does not protect
pre-existing documents, 0 the American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility requires that an attorney not reveal any
information acquired through a "professional relationship" that
would be "detrimental" to his client.0 A client's tax records fall
within these guidelines even though not protected by the attorney-
client privilege. Since information need only have been acquired
through the "professional relationship" to be protected,' 0 the Code
103. 500 F.2d at 685-86.
104. 409 U.S. at 334. Couch has been criticized on policy grounds because this rationale
favors those taxpayers wealthy enough to hire a full-time accountant. Id. at 342 n.4 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Indeed, the Couch decision as a whole protects those taxpayers able to afford
"house calls" by their accountants, thereby allowing the taxpayer to retain actual possession
at all times. Several commentators have recommended this tactic for taxpayers anxious to
avoid a potential summons. Coffee, Supreme Court's Couch Decision Signals New Directions
in Guarding Client's Records, 38 J. TAXATION 258, 260 (1973); Symposium, supra note 10, at
256.
105. 409 U.S. at 335.
106. 499 F.2d at 453.
107. See note 77 supra.
108. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspo smamrr, DR 4-101. The rule states: "(A) 'Confid-
ence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law,
and 'secret' refers to information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be
likely to be detrimental to the client. (B) . . . [A] lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a
confidence or secret of his client. .. ."
109. Id. EC 4-4. The Ethical Consideration provides: "[Tihe ethical obligation of a lawyer
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of Professional Responsibility creates an attorney-client relation-
ship which protects information that is beyond the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the
more generalized attorney-client relationship may not be used to
resist a summons;110 it does provide a significant indication of the
client's expectation of privacy in relation to the client's fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, however, because the at-
torney is bound to remain silent in all other instances."'
The Couch view of a client's expectation of privacy also is re-
flected by Justice Powell's reference to United States v. Judson 12
and Hill v. PhilpottM as cases in which ownership and possession
were "conjoined." ' An examination of Judson reveals that the doc-
uments at issue were owned by the taxpayer but in his attorney's
possession.115 The taxpayer in Hill both owned and possessed the
controverted records.' By equating these situations, Justice Powell
implied that an attorney's possession is the equivalent of his
client's,"17 a rationale which also pervades Judson.'5 Substantial
authority exists in support of this contention."' Professor Wigmore,
to guard the confidences and secrets of his client ?. . exists without regard to the nature or
source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge."
110. Id. DR 4-101(c)(2). If an attorney takes possession of records to prepare a client's tax
returns rather than to provide legal defense or advice, a closer case would be presented, this
situation paralleling the facts in Couch. For a discussion of the preparer of a tax return who
happens to be an attorney, see Symposium, supra note 10, at 241-45.
111. See Justice Marshall's comment in note 117 infra. There are a few narrow exceptions
to the general rule of Disciplinary Rule 4-101 which are not relevant to the present discussion.
See ABA CoDn op PROSSo1mNAL RxspoNsmmmrr, DR 4-101(C).
112. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
113. 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1971).
114. 409 U.S. at 330.
115. 322 F.2d at 462, 469.
116. 445 F.2d at 145.
117. Justice Marshall was more direct, stating: "A transfer to a lawyer is protected, not
simply because there is a recognized attorney-client privilege, but also because the ordinary
expectation is that the lawyer will not further publicize what he has been given." United
States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (dissenting opinion). The implication of Justice
Powell's statement is also noted in Symposium, supra note 10, at 183.84.
118. 322 F.2d at 466-68.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 467 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v.
Riland, 364 F. Supp. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Pritchard, 70-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9434 (N.D. Ala. 1970); United States v. Foster, Lewis, Langley & Onion, 65-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9418 (W.D. Tex. 1965); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 101 (N.D. Cal.
1956); 8 J. WIGMoRE, EvmEN C § 2307, at 592 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Note, Fifth
Amendment Rights of a Client Regarding Documents'Held by His Attorney: United States
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for example, has written that if the client could avoid compelled
production of a document by interposing his fifth amendment
privilege, the attorney actually possessing the document cannot be
compelled to produce. 12 The court in Judson made a particularly
forceful statement concerning this rule:
No other "third party" nor "agent" nor "representative" stands
in such a unique relationship between the accused and the judi-
cial process as does his attorney. He is the person besides the
client himself who is permitted to prepare and conduct the de-
fense of the matter under investigation. The attorney and his
client are so identical with respect to the function of the evi-
dence and to the proceedings which call for its production that
any distinction is mere sophistry. 21
This language, coupled with Justice Powell's equation in Couch of
an attorney's possession to that of his client, indicates that a tax-
payer should be regarded as having a reasonable expectation of
privacy when his records are in his attorney's possession.
Constitutional grounds also exist for upholding such expectations
because a failure to do so will have a chilling effect upon the client's
exercise of his sixth amendment right to counsel. 22 An attorney
would be hampered severely in defending a client in a criminal tax
fraud prosecution without free access to the client's records, yet a
client would not be likely to deliver sensitive records to him if the
client realized that by so doing he would open the door to compelled
production. 123 Thus a decision such as Fisher that a taxpayer's fifth
v. White, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1080, 1086-87; 42 FoRDHm L. REV. 197, 210 (1973). See McCoRtucK
ON EVIDENCE § 120 (E. Cleary rev. ed. 1972); 3 W. BLAcKSTONE, Cor mmrAlm *26. In the
United States the equation of an attorney's possession with that of his client was made as
early as 1917. People v. Minkowitz, 220 N.Y. 399, 115 N.E. 987 (1917). The Boccuto group of
courts often reached the opposite conclusion, but their persuasiveness is undermined by their
misapplication of the relevant cases. See notes 15-23 supra & accompanying text.
120. 8 J. WIGaopx, EvroENcE § 2307, at 592 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
121. 322 F.2d at 467.
122. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
123. Since there is no constitutional right to consult an accountant, it may be constitution-
ally permissible for the Supreme Court to rule that an accountant may view his client's
records only at the client's home or office if the client's fifth amendment privilege is to be
preserved. Whether the sixth amendment right to counsel can or should be so limited is
questionable. It has been said that the Government's attempts to discourage taxpayers from
giving tax records to their attorneys may be prompted by the belief that a taxpayer might be
persuaded to waive his fifth amendment privilege if he is without the advice of counsel. Lay,
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amendment privilege may not be asserted by his attorney limits the
effectiveness of the right to counsel, a right that has been the subject
of expansion, not contraction, over the last forty years.'
Notwithstanding the constitutional and practical reasons why a
taxpayer should be regarded as having a reasonable expectation of
privacy in records personally placed in his attorney's possession, two
avenues of attack upon such a determination remain for the Govern-
ment. On appeal of the Kasmir decision to the Supreme Court, the
Government may contend that the fifth amendment defense should
not be allowed because the taxpayer did not have "rightful posses-
sion."'rs Under this theory the taxpayer who transferred his records
Attorney's Assertion of His Client's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Criminal Tax
Investigations, 21 U. MAiw L. Rzv. 854, 862-63 (1967).
124. The trend is demonstrated by the following cases, cited in chronological order: Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (state must appoint counsel in capital cases for indigent
defendants unable to conduct own defense due to illiteracy or ignorance); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (appointed counsel required when indigent defendant charged
with felony); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (confession inadmissible when police
refused defendant's request for assistance of counsel); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (prior to any custodial interrogation, defendant must be advised of his right to coun-
sel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (no person may be imprisoned unless repre-
sented by counsel, even in misdemeanor cases). The sixth amendment privilege has not been
expanded to encompass all situations, however. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
(confession made without counsel may be admitted to show lack of credibility although not
admissible to prove guilt); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state must only provide
counsel for first appeal as of right).
One element of this expansion has been the requirement that law enforcement officials
advise suspects of their right to counsel before any custodial interrogation commences. Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Technically, the Government was not required to give
a Miranda warning to the taxpayer in Kasmir because he was not in custody at the time of
the interrogation. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Nevertheless, the taxpayer
in Kasmir received such a warning during his first encounter with Internal Revenue agents,
and within 24 hours thereafter delivered his records to an attorney. 499 F.2d at 446. The
Government then attempted to compel production by the attorney, creating an anomalous
situation whereby it first reminded the taxpayer of his right to counsel, then sought to
penalize him for exercising it. The irony of the Government's action emphasizes the tenuous
nature of its position in relation to the taxpayer's sixth amendment right to counsel.
It is not suggested that the Government intentionally deceived or defrauded the taxpayer,
although such an argument has been made in opposition to the Government's request for
certiorari in Kasmir. Respondents Brief Opposing Certiorari at 2, United States v. Kasmir,
No. 74-611 (U.S., filed Jan. 6, 1975). The Couch opinion noted that the individual's constitu-
tional rights must be balanced against society's interest in the collection of taxes. 409 U.S.
at 336. If, however, the Government is allowed to manipulate the taxpayer in the anomalous
manner described above, that balance will be weighted heavily towards the Government,
which would be given the power to make a taxpayer choose between ineffective representation
and self-incrimination.
125. The rightful possession argument was one of the Government's primary arguments
before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. There the court noted: "The government's
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from his accountant to his attorney for an improper reason, perhaps
to avoid compelled production after discovering that an investiga-
tion was in progress, would be precluded from having his attorney
assert his fifth amendment privilege. Strict adherence to this
theory, however, could void any transfer occurring after an investi-
gation is discovered, even if no summons has been served. As the
court correctly noted in Kasmir,1 1 the result of this theory is that
the taxpayer's rights become fixed when he discovers an investiga-
tion, even before a summons is served. A statement by Justice Pow-
ell in the Couch opinion clearly indicates that such an early deter-
mination of the taxpayer's rights would be premature: "The rights
and obligations of the parties became fixed when the summons was
served. ... ",2,
Justice Powell cited two appellate court cases in support of his
statement, United States v. Zakutansky'2 and United States v.
Lyons, 13 each holding that an accountant's post-summons transfer
to his client cannot alter the rights of the parties. In Zakutansky the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that a client
did not have rightful possession because the transfer in issue oc-
curred after service.'3 While reaching the same conclusion in Lyons,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit distinguished Cohen and
House on the ground that they concerned transfers occurring before
service,1 31 implying that transfer before service would have altered
the parties' rights. In neither Zakutansky nor Lyons was the tax-
payer's motivation held determinative;32 rather, it was the ,time of
transfer in relation to the arrival of the summons.
Moreover, there is little in the Couch opinion to suggest that a
most appealing argument is that the taxpayer had no 'rightful possession' here because this
enterprise by the taxpayer, his accountant, and his attorney was a 'frantic last minute effort
to put the requested records beyond the reach of a legitimate tax investigation' by 'winning
a footrace with agents of the government.' In spite of the argument's great superficial per-
suasiveness, we reject it." 499 F.2d at 450.
126. Id. at 450.
127. 409 U.S. at 329 n.9.
128. 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 1021 (1969).
129. 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971).
130. 401 F.2d at 72.
131. 442 F.2d at 1146.
132. The court did consider motivation in Zakutansky when determining ownership of the
records, but this factor is largely irrelevant in view of the emphasis which the Couch decision
placed upon possession as opposed to ownership. In Zakutansky the issue of the taxpayer's
possession was decided on the basis of the time of transfer. 401 F.2d at 72.
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taxpayer's motivation in obtaining possession is to be considered
determinative. Justice Powell's approval of Cohen was qualified by
his statement that the Court did not determine the requirements for
a "rightful possession" which would allow the assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege.' Cohen contained dictum to the effect that
even possession against the owner's will would permit assertion of
the privilege,'-" and this language appears to be the position that
Justice Powell hesitated to endorse. Because the legitimacy of a
transfer motivated by a desire to avoid compelled production was
not considered in Cohen, there would appear to be no reason to infer
that Justice Powell's use of the phrase "rightful possession" and his
caveat concerning Cohen support a test of the taxpayer's motivation
for the transfer of records.
Another potential objection to finding an expectation of privacy
in the attorney's possession of taxpayer records concerns the re-
quired-records doctrine of Shapiro v. United States."' As was the
case in Couch, the defendant in Shapiro was the sole proprietor of
a business. Pursuant to wartime price control legislation,"' the de-
fendant was required to maintain records of his business transac-
tions. In order to facilitate examinations of such required records,
Congress eliminated the fifth amendment privilege as a defense to
a subpoena duces tecum seeking such records and instead granted
immunity from prosecution to those for whom the fifth amendment
privilege otherwise would have been available. By a 5-4 margin, the
Supreme Court subsequently negated the Act's immunity provi-
sions by ruling that the fifth amendment privilege would not other-
wise have been available to the defendant because required records
cannot be privileged.? 7 This construction of the Act seems implausi-
ble: everyone who could have claimed the fifth amendment privilege
would have been granted immunity, but no one could have claimed
133. 409 U.S. at 331 n.12.
134. See notes 41, 56 supra. It is undisputed that in Kasmir the taxpayer held the docu-
ments with his accountant's permission, see 499 F.2d at 446; in Fisher the taxpayer probably
had his accountant's permission, see 500 F.2d at 685 n.2. But see notes 53-56 supra & accom-
panying text. Precedent exists for the proposition that the fifth amendment privilege is
unavailable if the accountant-owner demands the return of the records. Deck v. United
States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965); United States v.
Riland, 364 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Levy, 270 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn.
1967); United States v. Pizzo, 260 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
135. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
136. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
137. 335 U.S. at 19-20.
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it because required records could not be privileged. Justice Frank-
furter in dissent, argued that the fifth amendment is essentially a
dead letter if Congress can make public documents of records nor-
mally kept by individuals by the simple expedient of requiring that
those records be kept.'35 Perhaps because of the criticisms that can
be brought to bear upon the majority decision, the Supreme Court
has not applied the Shapiro doctrine to tax records, although several
lower courts have.'30
Nevertheless some courts"' and commentators see the required-
records doctrine as a tacit premise of the Couch decision, a view
seemingly supported by Justice Powell's statement that the "man-
datory disclosure" provisions of the Internal Revenue Code under-
cut the taxpayer's claimed expectation of privacy.1 Upon closer
examination this apparent support evaporates, however, because
Justice Powell's statement was addressed to the taxpayer's expecta-
tions of privacy while the records were in the accountant's posses-
sion, not the attorney's possession. Since a taxpayer's rights should
become fixed when the summons is served"4 and it is apparent that
taxpayer Couch could have avoided compelled production if she had
been in possession of the records when the summons was served,'4
the "mandatory disclosure" provisions are significant only while the
accountant has possession of the documents. Required records, on
138. Id. at 70. Justice Jackson was concerned that the majority rule might be expanded in
later cases, noting that the enforcement of the criminal laws undoubtedly would be advanced
if each person were required to keep a record of his daily misdeeds. Id. at 71.
139. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 789 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864
(1953); Stern v. Robinson, 262 F. Supp. 13, 15-16 (W.D. Tenn. 1966), appeal dismissed, 391
F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,. 390 U.S. 1027 (1968); United States v. Willis, 145 F.
Supp. 365, 369 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
140. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Custodian of Records, Mid-City Realty Co., 497 F.2d
218 (6th Cir. 1974) (tax records not an issue).
141. 15 B.C. him. & CoM. L. Ray. 185, 199 (1973); 40 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 211, 224 (1973). A
theory of the fifth amendment privilege somewhat similar to the Shapiro doctrine could, in
a very general way, be the basis for the recent series of decisions progressively narrowing the
scope of the fifth amendment's applicability in cases involving documents. See Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (intervention limited); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973) (taxpayer's documents in accountant's possession not protected); Bellis v. United
States, 94 S. Ct. 2179 (1974) (records of small partnership not protected); United States v.
Bisceglia, 95 S. Ct. 915 (1975) ("John Doe" summons may be used to determine taxpayer's
identity through his bank records).
142. 409 U.S. at 335.
143. Id. at 329 n.9.
144. See note 79 supra & accompanying text.
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the other hand, retain their status in any event, as evidenced by the
inability of the defendant in Shapiro to plead the fifth amendment
privilege even though the documents were in his possession. That
Couch does not extend the required-records doctrine to tax cases is
further indicated by the Court's failure to mention Shapiro despite
the fact that the Government's brief noted the case."'
It appears that the Couch reference to "mandatory disclosure"
was prompted only by the happenstance of the accountant's posses-
sion and was directed to the nature of the possessor rather than the
nature of the records. The comment was made in the context of a
discussion of the taxpayer's expectations, not during a consideration
of the type of records involved. Indeed, the Court's lengthy explica-
tion of its possession theory would have been unnecessary if Shapiro
were controlling authority. The Court's careful discussion of a dif-
ferent theory indicates that a possession analysis, coupled with an
examination of the taxpayer's expectation of privacy, is to be deter-
minative.
APPLICATION OF THE EXPECTATION ANALYSIS
The various judicial attempts to determine when attorneys hold-
ing summoned documents may assert their clients' fifth amendment
privilege have not produced an all-encompassing test. A synthesis
of these opinions, however, suggests that, absent actual possession
by the taxpayer, the fifth amendment defense yet may be available
to him if he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the docu-
ments at the time the summons is served. This method of analysis
has its origin in the expectation of privacy language found in
Couch.46
By eliminating any requirement for an instant of prior possession
by the taxpayer, the proposed test differs from the analysis used in
the opinions by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Pursuant
to the expectation of privacy approach taken in Kasmir, a court
must observe the relationship existing between the taxpayer and the
summoned documents at the moment of service of summons to
determine whether a pre-summons transfer of the records indicates
that the taxpayer had a reasonable expectation that they would be
kept private. The feature distinguishing the Kasmir approach from
145. Case Note, Couch v. United States-Protection of Taxpayers' Records, 23 DEPAUL L.
REV. 811, 819-20 (1974).
146. See notes 48-50 supra & accompanying text.
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the proposed test is the continued emphasis which that court placed
upon a moment's pre-summons possession by the taxpayer, no mat-
ter how fleeting. This brief actual possession was the fact by which
the Court of Appeals distinguished Kasmir from its prior holding in
White.147 Whether the taxpayer physically touched records during
their transfer from accountant to attorney should not alter the legal
consequences of the transfer, however. The taxpayer should be able
to assert his privilege in either situation if the existence of a "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy"' can be demonstrated; the absence
or presence of prior possession should be only one indicium of the
taxpayer's expectations. Moreover, the evaluation of the taxpayer's
expectations should focus upon the moment the summons is served
since that time is an administratively feasible termination point
prior to which a taxpayer should be free to maneuver.
Applying this test to the facts presented in Couch and White
would not produce an outcome different from that reached by the
respective courts. The taxpayer in Couch would be prevented from
raising the fifth amendment defense because she had relinquished
control of her records for many years to her accountant to have the
information contained therein made public in her income tax re-
turns;' thus no protectable expectations of privacy ever arose. The
outcome of the White decision also would remain unaltered, primar-
ily because the taxpayer's attorney obtained the documents from
the accountant without the taxpayer's knowledge or express permis-
sion. Since the taxpayer believed the records still to be in the ac-
countant's possession, he had no protectable expectations of pri-
vacy. If the taxpayer had known of and approved the transfer, appli-
cation of the expectation of privacy analysis would alter the out-
come of the decision.
Application of the analysis proposed in this Note might produce
a different outcome in Fisher. After improperly emphasizing an ac-
countant's prior preparation and ownership of summoned records,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Fisher apparently
concluded that thereafter a taxpayer never could develop expecta-
tions of privacy concerning the documents regardless of whether he
obtained personal possession and subsequently delivered them to an
147. 499 F.2d at 453-54. See note 97 supra & accompanying text. See also 12 HoUSTON L.
REV. 504, 506 (1975).
148. 499 F.2d at 452.
149. See notes 48-50 supra & accompanying text.
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attorney. A superior analysis would view the particular attorney-
client relationship existing when the records were summoned from
the attorney, rather than any previous accountant-client relation-
ship, to determine whether expectations of privacy existed. Adher-
ence to the stance assumed in Fisher would create a per se posses-
sion requirement subject only to a narrow custodial safekeeping
exception."'0
Material differences between the accountant-client and attor-
ney-client relationships, coupled with strong policy considerations
surrounding the sixth amendment right to counsel, militate against
adoption of the Fisher analysis. Furthermore, while authorship or
ownership of documents may give some indication of the taxpayer's
expectations of privacy, the primary factor should be the presence
or absence of some act reasonably calculated to protect the privacy
of records at the time the summons is served. The taxpayer might
evidence this desire by requiring his accountant to return the docu-
ments, by placing them in custodial safekeeping, by transferring
them to an attorney, or by reacquiring personal possession. Thus the
expectation of privacy analysis suggested by Couch and Kasmir, but
modified to eliminate any absolute requirement of an instant of
physical possession, presents a less mechanical, more satisfactory
approach for determining the availability of the fifth amendment as
a bar to the production of a taxpayer's records held by his attorney.
150. See notes 44-47 supra & accompanying text.
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